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MALCOLM

R. WILKEY

*

The Deep Ocean
Its Potential Mineral Resources and
Problems
I. The Comparative Pace in Law and Technology-Why and Where the Hurry
The past three years have seen an extraordinary flurry of activity
regarding the uses of the deep ocean in both technology and law. The
Malta Resolution of 1967 in the United Nations registered the interest
of the less developed countries in the supposed wealth of the ocean,
which was followed by the appointment of the Ad Hoc Committee in
December 1967. Extensive presentation of the technical and legal
problems of the deep ocean were made at the American Bar Association meetings in Montreal 1966 and Honolulu 1967. The House of
Delegates of the ABA adopted resolutions concerning United States
policy for undersea mineral resources in Montreal 1966 and Philadelphia 1968.
Many of my colleagues in the legal profession have leaped to their
feet at Bar Association meetings and rushed into print in legal periodicals
as if the technology for ocean resource development was about to ripen
overnight and a complete set of detailed laws to govern this hitherto
non-existent activity was immediately needed. Indeed, on 1 November
1967 when he offered his historic resolution in the United Nations,
Ambassador Pardo of Malta spoke of some $6 billion dollars of gross
annual income from undersea mineral development which could accrue
by 1975 to the U.N. if it controlled access to the ocean floor. The
Ambassador's premise for urging immediate international action reflects
a widespread misconception as to the current relative state of international law and technological progress. There are no facts remotely
supporting such dreams of undersea wealth. Furthermore, it is advisable
to keep in mind that the U.N. General Assembly does not make law.
In contrast to the prevailing tone of breathless immediacy, our first
concern should be to attain perspective. We need to take a good hard
* The views expressed are the individual views of the author only, and not necessarily those of the corporation for which he is general counsel.
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look at where we are with technological capabilities in the deep ocean,
the potential for near-term progress, the realizable riches and their comparable cost, the unknowns confronting us, the overall time elements
involved, the pressures for immediate action-and their sources. Then
we can intelligently arrange our priorities and determine our choicesand when we must make such choices-in regard to a legal regime
to encourage development of ocean mineral resources.
A few words as to present technical capabilities and potential for
the near term. The deepest offshore producing oil well is at a depth
of just over 300 feet. Recent bidding for continental shelf sites off the
shore of California was mostly at a depth less than 600 feet. In May of
1968 one of the largest international oil companies estimated that by
the end of a decade it would be drilling at depths of 5,000 to 6,000 feet.
The oil industry pattern obviously is to creep out from the shore, perfecting its technology for operations at gradually increasing depth.
In contrast, at the present time exploration vessels of the hard mining
industry can take a sample of hard minerals on the deep ocean bottom
at any depth, but this is only the surface of the ocean bottom. And,
there is presently no commercially feasible mining even in shallow continental shelf waters, with the exception of diamond and tin dredging,
the frasch mining of sulphur, and mining various substances by tunnels
driven from the land out under the sea bottom. When the hard mineral
mining industry develops a commercial capability, unlike the oil industry,
it may be anywhere in the deep ocean.
As to realizable riches and their comparable cost of extraction, it
is widely believed that hard minerals ultimately will be produced in
commercial quantities, but the case is certainly not proven yet. The
cost of obtaining minerals from the ocean floor will always have to be
balanced against the cost of obtaining the same minerals on dry land,
and as long as there exist minerals in quantity on dry land, they are
likely to be cheaper. Minerals existing somewhere in the world on dry
land does not mean that such minerals are accessible to very nation,
of course. Obviously, many interrelated commercial and political considerations will affect development of the riches realizable from the deep
ocean.
The biggest signal for caution in deciding immediately what should
and should not be done is the modest realization of how much is
actually unknown about the deep ocean. Even the facts of the sea
and the life therein are largely unknown. Nodules containing a high
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mineralization are spread like a carpet in some areas, but how wide
and how frequent are these mineralized carpets? Does there exist anywhere any mineralization in a large mass similar to an ore body on land?
In addition to the lack of knowledge of the sea and its life, we
are just beginning to learn the strategic technical facts of man's capability of sub-surface extended operations. This promises to be painfully
slow, perhaps much slower than in outer space. In outer space the change
is only from one atmospheric pressure to zero. In the deep ocean we're
dealing with pressure changes from one to fifteen atmospheres. Progress in subsurface activity may encounter commensurate difficulty.
As to priorities, the basic need now is for food the world over.
The same basic need for minerals does not exist. The report of the
Thirty-Third American Assembly at Arden House on Uses of the Seas,
held 2-5 May 1968, stated: "In respect to the peaceful uses of the sea
over the next decade, primary interest will be in the harvest of food
and of minerals . . . . As to minerals the most important economically
will continue to be oil and gas, more than one-sixth of which already
comes from offshore wells. The largest new reserves will probably be
found on the continental shelf and slope. Within ten years all these
reserves will probably be technologically, if not economically, exploitable.
Barring unforeseen developments, there seems less prospect, before the
turn of the century, for large-scale economic recovery of solid minerals
from the deep sea bed, with phosphorites and manganese nodules being
the most likely possibilities."
One "unknown," widely believed to be delaying exploration and
development of the deep ocean, in truth is not unknown and is probably
causing no delay. For some years one distinguished speaker after
another, some legal and some lay, has expounded on the need for a
legal regime for the deep ocean, on the principal ground that without
a new legal regime, both detailed and certain, technical progress would
be greatly delayed. The business leaders who are deciding where to
spend money for technical development apparently have not received
the word from these luminaries. At a meeting in March 1968 representatives of some fourteen large corporations with extensive mineral
interests, in response to direct questions, indicated that not one of the
companies at the present time was delaying of curtailing its expenditures for research, exploration, and development of the deep ocean
because of any uncertainty in the legal regime. Nor did any of the
companies represented know of any other companies who felt themselves so constricted. On the available evidence, the same could probInternational Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 1
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ably be said of the oil companies, who are steadily working out from
the shore line to greater and greater depth.
In contrast to some opinion, there is no legal void, there is no
real uncertainty as to the rules which apply in the deep ocean. The
public order of the oceans has been long established. In a nutshell, the
high seas (water surface and column) belong to everyone and are
therefore subject to appropriation by no one; the resources of the high
seas and the sea bottom beyond the legal continental shelf belong to
no one and are therefore subject to taking by anyone; the activities
of persons and nations pursuant to these rules must be respected by
everyone.
Why then the pressure for immediate action? The answer lies in
these areas: One, the attitude of the less developed countries; two, the
indefinite boundary between the legal continental shelf and the deep
ocean; three, a vital feature of mining codes on land which the present
international law of the sea lacks, i.e., exclusivity, on the protection of
an area discovered by exploration and appropriately marked. The lack
of this, combined with the necessity of committing vast sums to mining
ventures years in advance of commercial return, can be anticipated
ultimately to deter both exploration and development of mineral resources.
The attitude of the less developed countries is reflected in the
Malta Resolution, which was based on an erroneous idea of immediately
realizable riches from the ocean deeps. Proponents of the Malta proposal want to stake out a claim on the riches of the seas, through the
creation of an international regime, which would exercise some or all
of the attributes of sovereignty and ownership. It is obvious that the
United Nations Assembly does not make law, but pragmatically it is
also obvious that those who like the Malta proposal could complicate the
task of ultimately securing rational multi-nation agreements clarifying
the boundary between the continental shelf and establishing an orderly,
detailed legal regime for deep ocean mineral resources. This they could
do by an ill-considered Assembly Resolution proclaiming a spurious
U.N. sovereignty or ownership of deep ocean mineral resources, with
all proceeds to go to the satisfaction of international community needs.
The twin certainties, that such an assertion by the U.N. would not be
recognized by the major powers and that such action would diminish,
not enhance, the likelihood of mankind benefitting speedily from any
proceeds of the deep ocean, should logically deter any such step, but
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sheer logic can rarely be relied upon to prevail in U.N.-or other human-affairs.
Another spur to immediate action in regard to the legal regime of
the deep ocean is the admitted uncertainty as to the location of the
boundary between the continental shelf of the coastal state and the
international deep ocean bottom. There are also local boundary uncertainties. If all the nations of the world accepted the pertinent boundaries as international law defines them, i.e., the width of the territorial
sea at three to twelve miles, a contiguous zone of twelve miles, the rights
of all nations to freedom of the seas outside these limits, the continental
shelf of the 1958 Geneva Convention (with the boundary clarified),
there would probably be little cause for concern. But certain of the
LDC's in various parts of the world decline to accept all of these definitions. Indonesia has its own idea of the territorial sea and of passage
through certain narrow straits; Peru, Ecuador and Chile have asserted
sovereign rights for two hundred miles into the Pacific; and Argentina
by unilateral declaration has proclaimed sovereignty, not just sovereign
rights for limited purposes in the language of the Geneva Convention,
over its continental shelf.
A word about lead time and investment magnitude in mining ventures. The exploratory phase ordinarily may be as brief as three years
or as long as a decade. The money gambled at this stage may be in
excess of a million and could be several million. Once a decision is made
to develop the property, another three to seven years will elapse before
the first ton of ore is processed. For any large non-ferrous mine, the
total expenditure by the time production is attained will be from twentyfive to two hundred million dollars.
All this is on dry land. What time and expenditures should be
contemplated undersea no one knows. Obviously no profit seeking venture of this magnitude, by private capital or socialist state capital, is
going to be launched in the ocean deep without recognized legal rules
guaranteeing security of exclusive tenure. No one is panting to plunge
into the deep ocean today, but the magnitude of early investment and
technological lead time required must be considered in the calculation
of when detailed legal rules for the deep ocean will be required.
The U.S. State Department has opted for an affirmative approach,
i.e., providing positive leadership by introducing in the U.N. Ad Hoc
Committee on 28 June 1968 a set of draft "Principles Concerning the
Deep Ocean Floor," which state as the objective "to encourage the
exploration, use and development of the deep ocean floor to the fullest
International Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 1
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extent possible for the benefit and in the interest of all mankind." The
seven principles are intended to recognize and move toward a solution
of the problems of the deep ocean by delineating broad areas of agreement, without now spelling out specific terms of agreements which
remain to be negotiated in the light of much knowledge yet to be
acquired. The method or vehicle by which the above objective is to
be reached is clearly to be a negotiated multi-nation agreement or
agreements, not a U.N. proclamation. And, it is recognized that while
"the orderly development of resources of the deep ocean floor" must
reflect the "interest of the international community," such development
can only take place under "conditions conducive to the making of
investments necessary for the exploration and exploitation of resources."
The Ad Hoc Committee met in Rio de Janeiro in late August 1968,
preparatory to the convening of the U.N. General Assembly. At the
moment of writing, it seems unlikely that the Committee will have anything but an interim report for the Assembly in 1968, nor is any extensive formal debate on the subject likely, as the Legal and Economic and Technical Working Groups have yet to complete their labors
for the Ad Hoc Committee.
On 8 August 1968 the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association adopted a Resolution on the natural resources of the deep
ocean floor which had the tri-partite recommendation of the Sections
of Natural Resources Law, International and Comparative Law, and
the Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations.'
The ABA supported the establishment "as soon as practicable" of "internationally agreed arrangements" for exploitation of the natural resources
of the deep ocean floor, and in the interim the protection of those resources "from claims of sovereignty or rights of discretionary control
by any nation or group or organization of nations."
The Committee on Deep Sea Mineral Resources of the American
Branch of the International Law Association on 19 July 1968 published
an Interim Report making recommendations concerning the legal framework for the exploration and exploitation of deep ocean mineral resources, which were more explicit but not dissimilar to the recommendations of the American Bar Association adopted three weeks later.2
1The ABA Resolution and Joint Section Report is printed in full at pp. 6-8
and is discussed later in this article.
2 The American Branch Committee report was presented at the 53d Biennial
Conference of the International Law Association at Buenos Aires in late August
1968. Action taken on this subject by the ILA Conference was not available
at time of writing.
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The ABA and ILA actions, like the State Department's draft
Principles in the Ad Hoc Committee, are efforts to move affirmatively
in good time to meet present and anticipated legal problems, and to
forestall precipitate ill-advised action which would seriously hamper the
development of deep ocean mineral resources as rapidly as is technologically possible.
From the above, it is obvious that the pressures for immediate
action to create a new detailed legal regime for deep ocean mineral
resources arise, not from any foreseeable technological and economic
breakthroughs, but principally from the fear and suspicion that unless some international action is taken now the richer nations will
seize the dreamed of wealth under sea. Concomitantly, but of lesser
importance, technical and legal experts most familiar with progress in
undersea mineral exploration now anticipate the need both for a clarification of the boundary between the legal continental shelf and the
deep ocean floor and also, as a minimal addition to existing international law, the creation of a widely accepted rule of secure exclusive
tenure, without which the huge investments necessary years in advance
of mineral production simply will not be forthcoming.
There are, therefore, some steps which should be taken at this time,
looking forward to the creation of an orderly and workable legal regime
for deep ocean mineral development. But as we take these steps, and
consider other choices, which may be labelled as urgent, we must keep
in mind that we do not even know the basic facts of sea life, we do not
know the nature of the technology that will make commercial mining
at all possible, and we have had at the present no experience with a
typical mining operation even on the shallow continental shelf. As
Richard Young has wisely concluded: ". . . it is prudent to make haste
slowly. To be durable and satisfactory, a regime for deep-sea bottom
resources must be based on a solid knowledge of geographical facts, of
technological capabilities present and anticipated, and of political and
economic realities. It is believed that the analysis and synthesis of these
elements have not advanced to the stage where decisions of a permanent
character can be made with wisdom. . . . The need now, in law as
well as in science, is for more exploration of problems presented by
the deep sea. Options should be kept open and positions unfrozen. The
lemmings' march into the ocean is not a binding precedent." I
8 Young, The Legal Regime of the Deep Sea Floor, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 641,
651,653.
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The goal of legal policy should be to strike the delicate balance
between providing maximum certainty in legal rules without freezing
the legal regime in a form which subsequent scientific developments
will render an irritating, inequitable anachronism. The purpose of the
remainder of this paper is to outline orderly steps to accomplish this.
H. Legal Policy and Problems Relating to Undersea Mining
We can agree with those who argue that the oceans offer a potentially
large source of some minerals. But at the same time, we must recognize
that whether, and when, these prove to be economically recoverable is
dependent on developments in technology, a favorable legal framework,
and satisfactory rates of profit on funds invested similar to comparable
opportunities on dry land.
Legal policy and problems relating to undersea mining are inseparable from the peculiar environment. It must be remembered that
even on dry land and with all modern prospecting techniques mineral
exploration remains a chancy business. It is obviously more so when
operations must be conducted under multiple atmospheric pressures, hundreds of feet below the ocean surface, in an environment of which so
much of a technical and scientific nature is yet to be learned.
The three problem areas require somewhat different treatment:
A. The boundary between the area which by treaty is now under
national jurisdiction (the continental shelf) and the area beyond (the
deep ocean) should be unequivocally defined with precision.
B. The United States and other nations having jurisdiction over
adjacent continental shelves should at the earliest opportunity formulate
definite working rules to encourage and regulate exploration and exploitation.
C. Until we can agree on working rules as definitive as those
which individual nations can promulgate comparatively quickly for their
continental shelves, the established international law principles regarding freedom of the seas should be carefully preserved for the deep
ocean.
Turning to these three areas:
A. The Boundary Between the Continental Shelf and the Deep Ocean
The vagueness of the outer limit of national jurisdiction on the
seabed could be of great concern to the mining industry in the near
International Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. I
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future. For the mining industry to exploit on a commercial basis (as
distinct from exploring) the mineral resources of the outer continental
shelf and the deep ocean bottom beyond, there must be some settlement of this boundary-at least for mining investment purposes. It
is more important that this boundary be established than where it is
established.
But as a practical matter, experience has shown that the effort
to draw a rule of universal application the world over is likely to result
in a rule so vague as to invite dispute. Since the outer limit of the
geological continental shelf is not a well-defined physical landmark in
some areas and is relatively close to the shores of other countries, while
the foot of the continental slope is more clearly defined and is a greater
distance from the limit of territorial waters, the use of the continental
slope or arbitrary boundaries might be much more equitable, and might
strike an acceptable balance between the political necessity of contiguity
and the economic necessity of certainty in legal rights.
An ultimate international agreement redefining the continental
shelf or an agreed interpretation of its present definition, might be
reached in three steps:
1. Through an international scientific commission created for the
purpose, as soon as practicable select certain areas and chart therein
proposed boundaries in areas where, in its opinion, the continental
slope is an identifiable feature, and point out those areas where the
continental slope has indistinct geological determination and thus where
arbitrary boundaries might be more serviceable.
2. Redefine the outer limit of the legal continental shelf as the
foot of the continental slope, wherever such delineation exists as an
identifiable geological feature, regardless of the distance from shore or
the depth of the superjacent waters. (Perhaps this area should then be
renamed the "continental margin.")
3. Failing a definition by an identifiable natural boundary, then
the outer limit of the legal continental shelf (or "continental margin")
would be defined in all other places as a certain arbitrary distance from
the coastline.
An alternative method of establishing a precise boundary would
be on a depth basis, but it is suggested an agreed distance is superior
for several reasons: it is more clearly ascertainable, and thus freer from
dispute; it is more equitable, giving each nation the same width continental shelf, while a depth standard would produce great disparities
International Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 1
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in width; and, it provides a uniform area in which the coastal states
can exert control for defense purposes over mineral extraction installations, on which coastal states will probably insist anyway.
The above alignment while having the merits of certainty and
justice, must be reached by international agreement-which means the
result will be some years hence. It would be helpful to clarify this
boundary in some areas at the earliest time. To wait to tidy up the rule
everywhere at once would mean uncertainty will persist everywhere for
many, many years.
Therefore, for the purpose of achieving immediate certainty in
legal rights in limited areas, and not to the exclusion of other necessary
international arrangements which may come later, the United States
should seek agreement on the boundaries of the continental shelf in,
for example, the Caribbean or Gulf of Mexico, with other coastal states
in the area. At the same time, for other areas of the U.S. continental
shelf, the U.S. might announce its intention not to claim permanent
exclusive rights to natural resources of the deep ocean beyond a certain
arbitrary distance from the limit of its territorial waters, pending a
redefinition of the continental shelf by international agreement. And
pending such international agreement, the U.S. would continue to issue
licenses for exploitation to the full extent permitted by the present
1958 Convention definition, with appropriate qualification as to modification by any subsequent treaty entered into by the U.S. Such a
treaty might well contain a "grandfather clause" as to the then existing
rights.
If the agreed boundaries in limited areas and the boundary
announced unilaterally by the U.S. went no further than the 1958 Convention permits, they would be in the nature of self-denying ordinances
not likely to be challenged by outside states. Such unilateral pronouncements should be strictly conditioned on reciprocity, and in fact, boundaries established NOW by these methods might well be emulated by other
nations in other areas. There would thus be immediately established a
certainty of legal rights in many of the most critical and important potential seabed mining areas of the world. In those areas at least free enterprise exploration and development would be encouraged, without waiting
for a uniform universal legal regime.
Some persons in the U.S. State Department have voiced doubts
about the advisability of any type of interim action pending negotiation of an international agreement, chiefly on the ground that any interim
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action might trigger some ill advised action. Such reservations appear
on analysis to be baseless. Any unilateral announcement, or limited
local agreement of a policy to be followed as to the continental shelf
boundary, so long as it did not exceed the generally accepted limits of the
1958 continental shelf definition, must be regarded as a tangible good
faith effort by the U.S. to preserve the resources of the deep ocean for
the benefit of all mankind under a future detailed international legal
regime yet to be agreed upon. And as a practical economic matter, it
would be an undeniable effort to establish now the requisite certainty in
limited areas, both within and outside the national continental shelf,
without which exploration and technical progress may well be stymied.
The above proposal for interim action is consistent with the Resolution of 8 August 1968 by the House of Delegates of the ABA, which
recommended inter alia "the issuance of parallel declarations or by
other means, an agreed interpretation of the definition of the boundary
between the area of exclusive sovereign rights with respect to natural
resources of the seabed and subsoil and the deep ocean floor beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction." The ABA further recommended "formulating rules and practices to be observed by common restraint or by
all nations on a nondiscriminatory basis, security of tenure to those
engaged in producing the resources in compliance with such rules, encouragement to discover and develop these resources, and optimum use
to the benefit of all peoples." I
It is submitted that if there is to be any "security of tenure," any
"encouragement to discover and develop these resources" anytime in
the near future, then some type interim arrangements, whether by
parallel declarations or otherwise, are an absolute necessity.
The formulation of a legal regime for the deep ocean, as discussed
under C. below, can be initiated simultaneously, but undeniably will
take a longer period of time to gain sufficient acceptance. It is this
work, the formulation of a legal regime for the deep ocean, which
appears to be the primary object of the Malta Resolution, the Ad Hoc
U.N. Committee, and the proposed draft treaty of Senator Claiborne
Pell (S.R. 263, 90th Congress, 2d Session). Yet logically the formulation of a legal regime for the deep ocean should come subsequent to
the precise determination of the boundary of the continental shelf.
4 Cf., Similar recommendation by Committee on Deep Sea Mineral Resources
of American Branch of The International Law Association Interim Report, 19
July 1968, page 18.
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Any draft of the legal regime for the deep ocean should draw heavily
upon the practical experience of those coastal states, such as the United
States, who logically will be able to put into operation an undersea
mining claim law covering the continental shelf, long before any multination code for the deep ocean can be agreed upon.
It is recognized that there is a connection between the ultimate
legal regime for the deep ocean beyond the continental shelf and the
exact location of the boundary between the continental shelf and the
deep ocean. Where the boundary is placed will affect the views of many
nations' as to what the legal regime should be.
For this reason, because a universally agreed upon boundary may
take as long to work out as the legal regime for the deep ocean, it is
all the more important to fix a certain boundary between the continental
shelf and the deep ocean on some basis other than universal agreement.
That is, on the basis of a clear scientific determination of the geological
features, or on the basis of an arbitrary boundary agreed upon by all
those nations concerned in a limited area, or on the basis of unilateral
or preferably parallel declarations clarifying the existing 1958 Convention definition. This will provide an area in which not only exploration but subsequent large-scale investment can be made with the requisite
legal certainty, and experience thus gained for application in other areas
of the globe.
It is also recognized that the United States is in a peculiarly influential position regarding the boundary location and the legal regime
for the deep ocean. There is apparent a conflict between the interests of
those nations who would profit by accepting maximum national rights
as presently recognized or obtainable by advanced technology under
the presently uncertain international legal definition of the continental
shelf, and those nations who on the other hand might profit by an
international legal regime covering a larger area. Obviously, the broader
the continental shelf definition, the narrower the international sea
regime. The United States has great interests which cut both ways,
perhaps as no other major power does. Shall we profit more by urging
a broadly defined continental shelf, thus restricting the high seas and
the deep ocean bottom area subject to an international regime, or shall
we exert our influence for a narrow continental shelf, a wider international sea area, confident that our advanced technology and unequaled
capital resources will enable the United States and its citizens to benefit
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more by this broader international regime, and simultaneously also
encourage a wider and more profitable world development?
B. The ContinentalShelf
Fortunately the need of rules for the adjacent continental shelf
already has been recognized in the United States. The hearings and
report of the Public Land Law Commission should lead to clear-cut
workable rules applicable to our continental shelf, which could be
adapted to other countries to their own situations. In the formulation
of these rules, recognition must be given to the necessity of respecting
the discoveries of exploratory parties. Without the assurance that mineral
areas found within the area marked out for exploration will be safeguarded from intrusion by others, no meaningful development of the
submarine resources can be anticipated.
It cannot be stressed too emphatically that risks in this new field
of exploration are so great that a high degree of certainty must be
assured in the definition and duration of the legal rights of explorer,
developer, and producer. Here it is pertinent to point out differences
in experience and resulting differences in the approach taken by the
oil and mining industry.
The oil industry was easily attracted into the marine environment
because the geology extended gradually under the ocean and the same
technology with modifications was available to develop oil in progressively deeper water. The oil industry has had long experience in evaluating concealed targets, whereas the mining industry has only recently
attacked buried targets on dry land. For all concealed targets exploration costs are high, but for the oil man, once the target has been discovered, extraction and operating costs are comparatively low.
For the mining industry the situation is different. In the case of
ores, however, only a few types of placer ores extend across the strandline. Once an exploratory drill hole hits ore, this hole cannot be converted into a production unit. Instead, thereafter the rate of exploration
and of development expenditures increases, and the aggregate capital
invested builds up substantially without any compensating revenue for
a long period.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the philosophy, technology and geological environment, and financial risk encountered on
the ocean bottom by the miner can be equated neither to the miner's
experience on dry land nor to the oil operator's experience in either
International Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 1
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environment. There are strong indications that the rules governing the
oil and gas industry are being extended to cover mineral explorations
and development of the U.S. continental shelf. Such undiscriminating
extension would be highly detrimental to the nascent offshore mining
industry. The simple transfer of the rules and regulations of off shore
oil leasing is not the answer to induce the mining industry to invest in
the exploration and exploitation of the new marine environment.
A fresh new approach to undersea mining is needed, e.g., a marine
mining claim law. For the U.S. continental shelf the following rules
are suggested:
1. All sea bottom land should remain open to mineral exploration.
2. Mineral explorers should be entitled to secure land tenure before
a discovery has been made.
3. A mineral explorer should be permitted such exclusive land
tenure for a long enough time, covering a large enough area, so that
he can apply modern exploration techniques in logical sequence, with
sufficient time to reach valid conclusions.
4. The discoverer of an ore body should be allowed to establish
and retain rights for its exploitation, in accordance with predetermined
rules, including proof of performance.
5. The government should continue its long-established depletion
policies.
One hundred years ago it was deemed in the national interest to
develop the mineral wealth of the public domain. A mining law was
passed to entice the adventurer and the entrepreneur to invest his time,
talents and money in a search for ore in a remote, unexplored and uncharted "Wild West." The law was successful then, and is still successfully encouraging the seeker of metals in the western states.
Today it is deemed in the national interest to develop the mineral
wealth of the newly acquired, remote, unexplored, and uncharted "Wild
West"-the submerged continental shelf. The same law and philosophy,
appropriately adjusted to the wet environment, will entice the modem
adventurer and entrepreneur equally well as the previous legislation did
his forebears. Moreover, it will help make the offshore mine competitive
with the onshore equivalents.
C. The Deep Ocean

At the present time the doctrine that the deep ocean should be
protected from appropriation by any one nation or group of nations
is generally accepted. Ambassador Goldberg was only stating the
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historical principle of freedom of the seas when on 8 November 1967
he stated in the United Nations: "Whatever legal regime for the use
of the deep ocean floor may eventually be agreed upon, it should
insure that the deep ocean will be open to exploration and use by all
states without discrimination."

Similarly, Senator Pell's proposed draft treaty, introduced 5 March
1968, provides:
Article 1. Ocean space and the resources in ocean space shall be
free for exploration and exploitation by all nations without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality of opportunity,
and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free
access to all areas of ocean space.
Article 2. Ocean space is not subject to national appropriation
by claim of sovereignty, by means of use of [or] occupation, or by
any other means.
As we come to know more of the deep ocean bottom resources and
technological possibilities of recovering them from the ocean depths,
rules can be worked out and agreed upon by a multilateral convention.
Pending the acquisition of more technical knowledge, and the fixing
of firm detailed rules for the continental shelves (which logically will
be possible before any multi-national agreements), an overall policy in
regard to the deep ocean is needed. Unless and until experience proves
to the contrary, the United States should adhere to and seek to include
in any international agreement the following principles:
1. The deep ocean bottom should not be subjected to national
appropriation by any claim of national sovereignty. However, this
should not preclude such undisturbed physical occupation for such
period of time of a given seabed as is necessary for mineral exploration
and exploitation by personnel from any nation.
2. The deep ocean bottom should be free for exploration and
exploitation of minerals in a manner consistent with present or future
treaties and established international law in regard to the freedom of
the seas.
3. As rapidly as experience is accumulated, there should be developed by international argeement a deep ocean mining claim law with
rules similar to those outlined above regarding the national continental
shelf.
4. Creation of and administration of the above policy and program might be facilitated by some sort of specialized international organization. Such an international organization should not have any
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discretion in granting or refusing rights to explore or exploit undersea
ore bodies, but should confine its role to that of a claim-filing office
which issues permits on a first-come basis, subject to terms and conditions laid down in the treaty establishing such organization. Under no
circumstances should the exploration and development of the deep ocean
be subject to control by international political administrative bodies.
5. Pending the formulation and adoption of an overall multi-national treaty, regional treaties might be entered into by nations most
interested in the particular area covered by the treaty. This principle
has worked well in administering the resources of the deep sea in regard
to fisheries, fur seal, etc.
6. Even without formal treaties, reciprocity among the Great
Powers, who may well be the only nations engaged in undersea exploration for some years to come, in following certain common sense practices can establish a body of customary rules which other nations perforce will follow. The ABA recommended "formulating rules and
practices to be observed by common restraint." Thus is international
law built.
With this pragmatic, multi-faceted approach to the problem of
achieving legal certainty in both the continental shelf and deep ocean
for mining activities at the earliest possible date in some areas of the
world, even if not for all possible purposes and in all areas, the requisite
certainty of the legal regime for private exploration and ultimate commercial investment could be achieved in sufficient important areas of
the world in the immediate future.
Looking forward to what appears to this writer to be a more
distant future, the Thirty-Third Assembly on Uses of the Seas in its
report stated on 5 May 1968:
The United States should support the creation of international
machinery within the family of United Nations organizations with
responsibilities in respect to the exploitation of non-living resources
in the deep sea floor. Its functions might include :-issuance of
licenses for agreed activities and international registration and
regulation of such activities;-collection of an agreed share of
revenues for international agreed purposes, including benefits for
developing nations;-referral of disputes to international arbitration or adjudication;
The approach taken in this statement by the American Assembly
participants is basically consistent with that in Senator Pell's draft treaty,
but it is submitted, full realization of the objectives stated in both
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documents is necessarily some distance in the future. In the meantime,
it is highly important to establish a few working rules in some areas
of the globe, in order to gain technical knowledge and practical working
experience.
It is noteworthy that, while both the American Assembly's statement and Senator Pell's model treaty postulate an international licensing
regime, and the American Assembly goes so far as to refer to collection
of an agreed share revenues for internationally agreed purposes, including benefits for developing nations, in neither document is it specific
what size these revenues would be nor how they would be distributed.
Many people will urge that the international licensing regime should
be just that and no more, i.e., that the license fee should pay the cost
of the international administrative machinery only. Others will urge
that a higher share of the revenues be collected, in order that the less
developed countries, who have neither the technology nor the capital
to exploit the deep sea, and in some cases not even continental shelves,
can share in the wealth of what is now an international area.
If revenues in excess of an administrative license fee are to be
collected, many objections will be raised to endowing permanently any
particular international organization. One meritorious suggestion, which
has evoked considerable support, is to give any revenues in excess of
license fees to the World Bank as a capital fund, to be loaned to and
repaid by all nations of the world on the same principles as the Bank
now operates.
It has also been suggested that the referral of disputes to international arbitration or adjudication should be a referral to the new adjudicative machinery set up by the World Bank for the settlement of international investment disputes. For this there are several good reasons.
The World Bank machinery is designed to settle disputes between sovereign states and individual entrepreneurs, in contrast to that of the
World Court, whose only parties are sovereigns. On the negative side,
the record of the World Court as to speed of decision and absence of
political overtones has not been such as to encourage recourse to it.
Whatever legal regimes are devised for the continental shelves and
for the international deep ocean, it will take both capital and technology
to develop the mineral resources of the sea. By definition, the less developed countries have neither. This leaves the more advanced socialist
bloc countries (the Soviets and Eastern Europe) and the free-enterprise
western nations (including Japan, Australia and New Zealand in this
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liberal geographic definition) to supply the needed capital and technological know-how.
While capital in a socialist economy can be state-directed for national purposes unrelated to simple economics, money in a free-enterprise
system is absolutely impartial. It goes where it can receive the greatest
return proportionate to the risk. Exploration and exploitation of either
the U.S. continental shelf or the international deep ocean will not proceed if it appears to the private investor that more profitable ore deposits
can be discovered and developed elsewhere. The mining laws of many
countries, as they apply on land and in their adjacent seas, make these
areas direct competitors for U.S. exploration dollars.
Clearly, as it is in most human endeavor, reward is the key to the
development of the sea. The legal regime-covering continental shelf,
boundary location, deep ocean-must be tailored to provide the requisite reward. Only by so doing will undersea resources be explored
and brought to the surface to the benefit of all mankind.

